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Emily Buss**
A small group of people sit in a courtroom. At a table in the front near the
judge’s bench, two apparent professionals with large stacks of folders chat loudly and
jovially about last night’s game, then about a mutual friend who just changed jobs and
the funny memories about him they share. At some point their faces get a bit more
serious, their voices drop, and they talk about “placement,” “compliance,” and
“conditions,” clearly confirming some sort of agreement, probably about the upcoming
case, but it’s not clear.
Next to one of them sits a teenage boy. He is slouched down in his chair, mostly
looking at the floor. He is silent, unless addressed by his chatty tablemates, particularly
the one sitting next to him, who occasionally turns to him with an isolated question or
two. “How’s school?” “Everything okay at your aunt’s?”
Right behind the chatty professionals and silent teen are a couple of well-dressed
women who are engaged in a conversation of their own. They occasionally break into
the table chat, clearly talking about the silent teen, or “Aunt,” or “Mom,” or
“Grandma.”
In the back of the courtroom sits an elderly woman. Is this “Aunt”?
“Grandma”? Probably not “Mom.” This is all evident from the woman’s age and
presence in the courtroom. No introductions are made.
At some point, someone walks in from a side door and begins to arrange things
near the bench. She is warm and friendly with the table chatters, even joining in the chat.
She looks at the teen and says “Take off your hat.” Without warning, she directs “All
rise,” and a robed man walks in and takes the bench. One of the chatters makes a few
statements in an acronym-studded rapid fire, and then calls on one of the well-dressed
women to share a report. She stands to do so, running through the details of school,
home and mental health treatment in a cascade of words. At the end of this report, she
gestures to the back, “The aunt” (ah, it’s the aunt) “is here in court, your honor. Is there
anything you would like to say to the judge, Miss Jones?”
The aunt always has something to say. She has taken two buses to get to court,
has waited for three hours with little or nothing to do or eat, and there is something,
sometimes many somethings, that need to be done, or fixed, or responded to. Most on the
list won’t be done, or fixed, or responded to, at least not by anyone in the courtroom, but
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her commitment to the slouching teen is much appreciated and the looks and comments of
all the adults in the room tell her so. The aunt’s statement ends with a dramatic
declaration to the judge, “I’m not sure how much more of this I can take,” and the young
person—the source of her exasperation but in no way the person to whom she is
speaking—looks back down at the floor.
The second front table chatter gets his chance for a short burst of words after
which he turns to the teen sitting beside him. “Do you have anything you want to say to
the judge?” In response to this invitation the young person will likely shrug and shake
his head. If induced to talk, the adults on both sides of the bench display some
combination of concern and good will (or serious parental warning if that seems
appropriate) as they listen, but the impatience is visible on many faces as well. The
teenager is being politely waited out. At least that’s how it looks. The teen’s statement
leads to no questions or conversation, nor does it change the course of the decisions
made in any way. It does provoke an explanation from one of the nicely dressed women
about why whatever is on the teen’s mind doesn’t fit with current plans.
After a brief lecture from the judge about what the young person needs to do (and
does he understand?) the judge walks out, and the rest of those in the courtroom begin to
collect their things to leave. A few comments are made to the young person, and one
person shakes his hand. The chatters burst back into animated conversation about their
out-of-court life. The aunt and the young person mumble something to one another, then
look around to make sure the hearing is over and it is okay to go. Their irrelevance to
the chatters soon makes this clear, and they leave.
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

I have witnessed some version of this scenario many times over, in many juvenile
courts, in many states. As an academic researcher, I have observed hearings in both the
juvenile justice and child welfare systems. Before that, I spent several years at the table,
representing children in foster care. What I have found is that the scene is remarkably
similar in all ―dispositional‖ or ―dispositional review‖ hearings involving adolescents,
whether the adolescent came into state custody as a result of a criminal charge or
allegations of parental maltreatment.
Important details vary: Often the young person is not present at all. Sometimes he
appears in handcuffs with a guard. Sometimes the family members cry. Often the young
person dabs his eyes with his sleeve, determined not to cry. There are worse cases, where
the judge and lawyers ignore the young person and his family altogether or speak with
shocking disrespect. But I chose the details in the scenario to describe standard juvenile
court proceedings at their best. The most concerned and dedicated judges and the most
conscientious and hard working lawyers, caseworkers, and probation officers still come
together to discuss young people’s current needs and plans for the future in hearings that
look like this one.
The problem is not, simply, that young people are not given a chance to speak; they
often are. Rather, the problem is that, even when invited to speak, young people are in no
way meaningfully engaged in the hearing. This is, in part, because it is hard for anyone
other than the involved professionals to follow precisely which issues are being addressed
in the hearing. These professionals, who handle case after case with one another in the
same courtroom, follow hearing scripts and speak in a short hand that is familiar to them
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and obscure to everyone else. It is also in part because, in an important sense, most of the
decisions have been made before the hearing begins. Some decisions have been worked
out between the lawyers and government actors over the phone, in the hallway outside
the courtroom, or at meetings. Many have been worked out by repetitive practice. There
is a strong sense of ―the way things are done‖ that drives the planning and decisionmaking process in both the child welfare and juvenile justice systems. The hearing
serves to make those decisions official and to get the court’s endorsement, but there is
often very little left to be worked out.
If a young person succeeds in following the jargon-ridden presentations of the
lawyers and various agents of the state, he sees that his role is that of a polite listener with
a chance to say some words, not that of an active and engaged participant, let alone a
chief author and executor of the plans for his future. This lack of engagement should be a
concern at all hearings, but it is particularly troubling at dispositional hearings and
subsequent reviews, where those plans, and the steps required to achieve them, are the
primary focus.
In this essay, I argue that this juvenile court experience, the experience of
adolescents in juvenile court in the vast majority of dispositional and review hearings, is
unacceptable. It may violate their constitutional rights, and it certainly disserves their
important developmental needs. At best, young people’s experience in court is a lost
opportunity to nurture important aspects of their development in circumstances where we
as a society have shifted some or all responsibility for that development from parents to
the state. At worst, young people’s experience in court does developmental harm by
reinforcing the message that they do not belong in the community that sets the rules. It is
surely our minimal obligation, as lawyers and judges, to avoid causing this harm. But do
we not also have an obligation, as participants in the system that has taken developmental
responsibility for these children, to take every opportunity consistent with our roles to
nurture their development? Whatever else we press state actors to do to help young
people who have entered the juvenile justice and foster care systems, we lawyers and
judges should take advantage of the opportunities offered in juvenile court to help these
young people grow up.
As participants in this symposium celebrating twenty years of exceptional
advocacy by Northwestern’s Children and Family Justice Center, we were asked to
identify one or two major themes that should guide advocacy on behalf of children and
their families for the next 20 years. My co-panelists identified some core themes with
which I am in complete agreement: Addressing the underlying problem of poverty and
the related problem of inadequate education is key to any real improvement in the lives of
the families whose children are at risk of removal and arrest. 1 Moreover, recognizing the
power of the ongoing connection between children and parents that makes children’s
removal always harmful and almost always wrong is key to any significant reform of the

1

See generally Bruce A. Boyer & Amy E. Halbrook, Advocating for Children in Care in a Climate of
Child Economic Recession: The Relationship Between Poverty and Maltreatment, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC.
POL’Y 300 (2011) (arguing that rates of child maltreatment increase with nearly every indicator of low
socioeconomic status, including lack of a high school education and poverty).

320

Vol. 6:2]

¶7

¶8

Emily Buss

child welfare system.2 Similarly, keeping children out of jails and jail-like facilities is
essential to their prospects for healthy development and a productive adulthood.3
I add to these a more narrow, focused, aim, but one that would require radical
change and professional courage from lawyers and judges. While we serve children well
by keeping most of them out of child protection or juvenile justice proceedings
altogether, we owe those who come into the system treatment that reflects our special
obligation to them and responds to their important developmental needs. In this essay, I
focus particularly on adolescents and their treatment at the hands of judges and lawyers in
juvenile court. While many of the issues these adolescents face circle back to the big
themes identified by others (poverty, education, family preservation, etc.), adolescents in
state custody face a special set of issues and opportunities created by their participation in
juvenile court.
In dependency and delinquency proceedings, decisions are made that should reflect
and surely will determine young people’s life plans. Whether and when they become
parents, how far and in what direction they go in school, whether they obey the law, with
whom they associate, and how healthy they will be are only some of the important life
outcomes that will be shaped by the decisions made in juvenile court. The planning
process is important for young people not only because of its ultimate aim—their
maturation into young adults capable of successful and independent adult functioning—
but also because the process itself can develop skills and an understanding of self that can
help them achieve that aim. But the current process is not designed to take any account
of its developmental effects on young people, good or bad. The source of this deficit is
not, for the most part, the law. Indeed, federal statute requires juvenile courts to
―consult‖ with children in an ―age-appropriate manner,‖ in all permanency planning
reviews of child protection cases,4 and the due process protections afforded young people
in court can readily be understood to embrace a right of participation that serves their
developmental needs.5 Rather, the primary obstacle to change that would enhance the
developmental value of the hearings is convention. The same actors appear in court day
after day, and they all know what to expect of one another.6 Changing court processes
will require some combination of lawyers and judges to depart from convention and take
some chances. In the end, we will only learn if lawyers and judges can make the sort of
difference I am calling for here if we give this changed approach a try.

2

See Annette Ruth Appell, The Myth of Separation, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 291 (2011).
See James Bell, Founder & Executive Dir., W. Haywood Burns Inst., Prepared Opening Remarks at the
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy’s 2010 Symposium: Seize the Moment: Justice For the
Child (Oct. 8, 2010), in 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 279 (2011).
4
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2008).
5
Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Development Research, 38
HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 62 (arguing that due process rights are ―particularly well suited for developmentaleffects focused analysis‖ because participation is a core value of these rights, and children learn through
their engagement in the process).
6
See Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm? Analyzing the Institutional Culture of
Family Courts Through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 55
(2010) (arguing that the institutional culture of family courts, where lawyers, court administrators,
caseworkers and judges interact with one another on a daily basis, has led to a form of ―groupthink‖ that
stifles conversation and innovation and discourages loyal client-centered advocacy).
3
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II. THE DEVELOPMENTAL STAKES OF THE COURT PROCESS
¶9

In both dependency and delinquency proceedings, at disposition and beyond,
planning for a young person’s future plays a central role. In dependency proceedings,
federal law requires the juvenile court to consider the design and implementation of a
―case plan,‖ which covers education, placement, and all other important aspects of the
young person’s life,7 and a ―permanency plan,‖ which looks to the young person’s
future.8 In delinquency proceedings, state legislation requires juvenile courts to impose
consequences for wrongdoing that are designed to take account of the young person’s
current needs, and to prepare him for a productive, pro-social, adult future.9 But while
state and federal law directs the juvenile court to order dispositions designed to help
prepare young people for independent adulthood, young people’s treatment in court by all
present, including the most able and well-intentioned attorneys, thwarts this preparation.
¶10
Adolescents’ experience in juvenile court disserves two primary developmental
tasks of adolescence: the first task is gaining the experience required for competent
decision-making and autonomous action, and the second is the development of an
understanding of self, as an individual and a member of various groups and communities,
that can guide those decisions and actions. After offering a brief description of these two
developmental tasks and how they are accomplished, I will return to the juvenile court
and how it falls short.
¶11
One of the primary developmental tasks for adolescents is learning to harness their
newly acquired cognitive capacities to make ―good decisions,‖ that is, decisions that will
allow them to assume responsibility for their own lives and function successfully in
society.10 It takes practice to become a competent decision maker who can assess short
and long-term interests, develop plans to serve those interests, act on those interests, and
7

42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(A)–(C) (2009). This legislation allows for the content and implementation of the
child welfare agency’s case plan to be reviewed by either a court or an administrative entity, but for various
reasons, historical and practical, states have assigned the bulk of this reviewing authority to the courts.
8
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C)(i) (while the focus of permanency planning for younger children is generally either
return home, adoption or guardianship, the most common permanency plan for older foster children is
―another planned permanent living arrangement‖ or ―APPLA,‖ which contemplates a transition from foster
care directly to independence in adulthood, with planning focused on future schooling, living arrangements,
the need for mental health treatment and the like).
9
See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101 (2010) (stating that one of the ―important purposes‖ of the
Juvenile Justice system is ―[t]o provide an individualized assessment of each . . . adjudicated delinquent
juvenile, in order to rehabilitate and to prevent further delinquent behavior through the development of
competency . . . [including] educational, vocational, social, emotional and basic life skills‖). While states
have shifted some attention to the aims of community safety and victim compensation in recent years, they
have preserved in their statutory structure the aim of ―rehabilitation,‖ or ―treatment‖ of offenders. And
even the goals of victim compensation, community security and societal retribution are often couched in
language that suggests these objectives can be achieved in a way that serves offenders’ developmental
interests as well. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. § 2A:4A-21 (2010) (directing courts to ―insure that any services and
sanctions for juveniles provide balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of
accountability for offenses committed, fostering interaction and dialogue between the offender, victim and
community and the development of competencies to enable children to become responsible and productive
members of the community‖).
10
See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why
Adolescents May be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. L. 741, 744–45 (2000) (distinguishing
adolescents’ cognitive development, which is close to that of adults, from their psycho-social development,
which lags behind and produces poor decisions).
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then take responsibility for those actions. To be effective, this practice should occur in
contexts in which adolescents care about the outcomes of the decisions being made.11
Moreover, to ensure that adolescents have the opportunity to learn from their mistakes, it
is also important that the decision making occur in contexts in which the decision-making
process can be monitored and supported by caring adults. I will argue below that court
hearings can offer precisely this combination: a focus on decisions that matter to young
people in a context in which decisions and actions can be supervised and supported by
concerned adults.
¶12
The second crucial developmental task of adolescence is identity formation, the
process through which young people sort out who they are and how they relate to the rest
of the world.12 This process depends on young people’s interactions with others, both
adults and peers. Through these interactions, we learn how others perceive us and what
they expect of us. This helps us understand ourselves and how we fit into the various
communities with which we interact.13 Our relationships also give us opportunities to try
on various identities, to explore various roles and values through both formal and
informal group activities.14 Through these interactions with others, we hash out our
understanding of our beliefs, our values, our personalities, and our affiliations. One
aspect of this identity formation that is particularly important to adolescents’ experiences
in court is the development of an understanding of legal actors and institutions and one’s
own relationship to those actors and institutions. While there is an extensive literature
that considers the legal socialization process among adults, research has just begun to
explore how that socialization process relates to individuals’ emerging identities in
adolescence.15
¶13
Decision-making competence and identity formation are distinct developmental
ends, but they are often served by a common set of experiences and interactions.
Contexts in which young people are given decision-making authority over matters of
importance to them and in which adults engage them in a manner that is supportive and
respectful allow young people to develop decision-making skills, learn and recover from
11

Emphasizing the importance of giving adolescents a chance to get meaningful practice making decisions
for themselves, Frank Zimring has persuasively argued for a period of ―semi-autonomy,‖ during which
adolescents are afforded some adult-like autonomy rights while being shielded from the most serious,
negative consequences of their bad decisions. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF
ADOLESCENCE 99, 103, 132 (1982).
12
See LAURA E. BERK, CHILD DEVELOPMENT 463–69 (8th ed. 2009) (noting the importance of identity
development in adolescence, and summarizing the relevant literature).
13
See, e.g., William B. Swann, Jr. & Jennifer K. Bosson, Self and Identity, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 599–601 (Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert & Gardner Lindzey eds., 5th ed. 2010)
(summarizing interpersonal origins of the self and identity).
14
See, e.g., Laura E. Berk, CHILD DEV. 466–69 (8th ed. 2009) (describing relational influences on identity
development, and particularly, the way in which others offer adolescents an opportunity to explore various
possible roles and values).
15
See Alex R. Piquero, Jeffrey Fagan, Edward P. Mulvey, Laurence Steinberg & Candice Odgers,
Developmental Trajectories of Legal Socialization Among Serious Adolescent Offenders, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 267 (2005) (noting the limited research to date addressing how adolescents are socialized
about the law through their life experience and the likelihood that ―the process of legal socialization should
be particularly salient during adolescence, since this is the developmental period during which individuals
are beginning to form an adult-like understanding of society and its institutions, and when they venture
outside the closed systems of family and schools to experience laws and rules in a variety of social
contexts‖).
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their mistakes, and build on their successes. In the course of doing so, young people also
learn about themselves both as individuals and as members of groups that include those
adults with whom they have engaged. Where that interaction is positive, adolescents
might be expected to maximize the value of the practice and experience an affiliation
with the involved adults and the institutions they represent. Where negative, we should
worry both that their learning may be undermined, and that they may see themselves as
opposed to, or at least disconnected from, the participating adults.
¶14
Along both of these developmental dimensions, young people’s experience in
juvenile court runs from empty to negative. Juvenile court proceedings offer young
people little to no opportunity to practice making choices and taking responsibility for
those choices, despite the focus at those proceedings on their current and future plans. To
be sure, hearings are peppered with conditions, warnings and consequences directed at
young people, but these are tied to their obligations under plans designed by others, not
by themselves. Moreover, as the introductory scenario attempts to capture, the
interactions young people have with various adults, including their caseworkers, their
lawyers, and the judges, fail to convey any sense of connection between the young person
and those adults or the communities they represent. If anything, the message young
people get about their connection to the legal system and its actors is a destructive one:
the court process puts on display an intimate and powerful community of legal actors
representing government authority, and it is plainly a community from which the
adolescent and his family are excluded.
¶15
It is fairly easy to make the case that current court proceedings disserve
adolescents’ primary developmental needs, but it is less obvious that courts offer good
opportunities to serve these needs better. When children grow up in their families, they
develop their decision-making skills and emerging sense of social and personal identity in
their schools, their homes, and through various social and civic activities. An extensive
literature documents the value to adolescents of parents who offer them opportunities to
exercise some autonomy within the context of a caring relationship where parents
continue to exercise some control.16 An equally extensive literature documents the value
of adolescents’ involvement in extra-curricular activities that give them considerable
responsibility and decision-making control while fostering their engagement with peers
and non-family adult role models.17 Where such intra- and extra-familial opportunities
16

See, e.g., Brett Laursen & W. Andrew Collins, Parent-Child Relationships During Adolescence, in 1
HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 26–29 (Richard M. Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds., 3d ed.
2009) (reporting research that suggests that ―authoritative‖ parents, that is, parents who give their children
considerable room to make decisions, while showing warmth and engaging in ongoing supervision, most
successfully prepare their children for independence and social competence).
17
See, e.g., Jodi B. Dworkin et al., Adolescents’ Accounts of Growth Experiences in Youth Activities, 32 J.
YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 17, 20–24 (2003); Jacquelynne S. Eccles et al., Extracurricular Activities and
Adolescent Development, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 865, 876 (2003); Joseph L. Mahoney et al., Promoting
Interpersonal Competence and Educational Success Through Extracurricular Activity Participation, 95 J.
EDUC. PSYCHOL. 409, 415–17 (2003); Joseph L. Mahoney, Deborah Lowe Vandell, Sandra Simpkins &
Nicole Zarrett, Adolescent Out-of-School Activities, in 2 HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 251
(Richard M. Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds., 3d ed. 2009) (―[O]rganized activity participation allows
youth to practice social, physical, and cognitive skills that are useful in multiple settings . . . try on new
roles/identities in a safe environment; receive support from caring adults and peers; experience and
navigate intra- and interpersonal challenges and goals; and foster positive connections between family,
school, and community.‖).
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are available and productive for young people, they can be expected to have a
significantly greater developmental impact than court hearings, because the adults
involved will generally have more contact and deeper relationships with these young
people than court personnel can be expected to have.
¶16
For those involved in the juvenile justice and child welfare systems, however, these
more conventional opportunities for skill-building and pro-social identity development
are far less available. Adolescents in the child welfare system, who come from homes in
which they were found to be abused and neglected, are less likely to have been provided
with structured and supportive opportunities for independent decision making in those
homes. Their foster care placements are the least stable of any age group, and they often
end up in group homes, rather than in family settings.18 Neither unstable foster family
placements, nor discipline-oriented group homes are conducive to fostering adolescents’
experimentation with independent decision making or their exploration of groups and
activities in their communities. Even those adolescents who live in stable family foster
care are deprived of the opportunities afforded adolescents in developmentally
appropriate homes of origin. This is in large part because the foster care system is
focused on protecting young people from harm and their agencies from liability. These
twin concerns, joined with the bureaucratic complications of funding and transportation,
dramatically curtail foster youths’ opportunities to exercise their independence in
organizations and activities outside the home.19
¶17
For a somewhat different set of reasons, adolescents in the juvenile justice system
are also likely to be cut off from important developmental opportunities in their home
communities. First, many of these adolescents have parents whose care-giving is
comparable to those whose children end up in foster care.20 Second, adolescents in the
juvenile justice system are particularly likely to have attended poorly performing schools
and to have failed or dropped out of school.21 And finally, even if they live in
communities where productive extra-curricular activities are offered, their own behavior,
leading to their delinquency adjudication, often reflects a lack of engagement with those
activities.
18

See, e.g., ANNETTE SEMANCHIN, JONES & SUSAN J. WELLS, PATH/WISCONSIN–BREMER PROJECT:
PREVENTING PLACEMENT DISRUPTIONS IN FOSTER CARE, FINAL REPORT (2008) (citing multiple studies that
suggest that older children are at greater risk of foster care placement disruption); MARK E. COURTNEY,
SHERRI TERAO & NOEL BOST, CHAPIN HALL CENTER FOR CHILDREN AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: CONDITIONS OF YOUTH
PREPARING TO LEAVE STATE CARE (2004) (reporting that approximately eighteen percent of their subjects,
seventeen-year-olds in foster care, live in group homes or residential treatment facilities).
19
See EMILY BUSS ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL FOSTER CARE PROJECT’S PROTOCOL FOR
REFORM, FROM FOSTER CARE TO ADULTHOOD 36 (2008).
20
See, e.g., Lisa Ells, Note, Juvenile Psychopathy: The Hollow Promise of Prediction, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
158 (2005) (citing evidence that ―abused and neglected children [are a] group already overrepresented in
the juvenile justice system‖); ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 82 (1998) (citing
evidence suggesting that children who were abused and neglected are more likely to engage in violent
criminal offending in adolescence).
21
See, e.g., RUTH CURRAN NEILD & ROBERT BALFANZ, UNFULFILLED PROMISE: THE DIMENSIONS AND
CHARACTERISTICS OF PHILADELPHIA’S DROPOUT CRISIS, 2000-2005 32 (2006),
http://www.csos.jhu.edu/new/Neild_Balfanz_06.pdf (reporting that 22.6 percent of male dropouts end up in
juvenile justice placements, compared to 2.2 percent of graduates); Philip J. Cook, Denise C. Gottfredson
& Chongmin Na, School Crime Control and Prevention 313, 338 (2009) (noting the correlation between
chronic truancy and delinquency, among other problems).
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¶18

For young people in the juvenile justice and child welfare systems, juvenile court
might be the last opportunity, and might also be a particularly good opportunity, for the
state to assist them in developing their decision-making skills and to influence their
emerging understanding of themselves and their relationship to the law and the
government that implements it. ―Last‖ for young people in the child welfare system
because they will soon be expected to function as competent adults with far fewer
ongoing supports than those afforded to young adults who grow up in their own
families.22 And ―last‖ for young people involved in the juvenile justice system because
juvenile court jurisdiction is designed to capture young people on the brink of adulthood
and help them develop pro-social skills, attitudes, and behavior before they age into the
more purely punitive adult criminal justice system. And ―particularly good,‖ because the
legal actors involved, particularly the judges, so clearly represent government authority in
a human form and in a context with evident relevance to the juveniles’ lives.
¶19
As the legal entity with authority to oversee a young person’s long- and short-term
planning, the court has a unique ability to shift decision-making control to young people
and to support that shift by removing obstacles and demanding assistance from those
state agents to whom responsibility for the adolescents has been assigned. Moreover,
when a judge, whose legal authority is well understood, shows a young person respect
and attention, we have reason to hope that that the young person may translate that
positive, concrete, human relationship into a more positive conception of the legal system
that the judge is understood to represent. In the section that follows, I explore
innovations and social scientific findings that suggest that adolescents might benefit from
a shift in court practice toward these ends. After exploring these innovations and
findings, most of which have been developed outside the conventional juvenile court
hearing process, I return to a consideration of how their lessons might be applied to
improve the value of juvenile court proceedings for juveniles.
A. Developmental Opportunities in Child Welfare Proceedings
¶20

Experiments in the child welfare context suggest that judges can play a special role
in fostering the development of adolescents who have grown up in state custody if they
are willing to structure their hearings in a dramatically different way. The most notable
example of this shift in approach is the Cook County Juvenile Court’s Benchmark
Permanency Hearings, which have served as a model for a small number of other
forward-thinking child welfare courts around the country.23 This approach was
developed in large part by the single Cook County judge originally assigned to hear the
cases of older teens in foster care. At the Benchmark Hearings the judge and the young
person (ranging in age from sixteen to twenty-one) are the two primary participants, and
they engage in a direct conversation focused on the young person’s short and long-term
goals. As these goals are fleshed out, the judge can manifest the state’s power and
support by ordering the cooperation and support of the state actors’ charged with the
22

BUSS ET AL., supra note 19, at 3 (noting that foster youth are required to take on full responsibility for
themselves as soon as they ―age out‖ of the system, whereas youth growing up in their own homes continue
to rely on their parents for material and emotional support well into their adult years).
23
See COOK COUNTY CHILD PROTECTION DIVISION, A COURT GUIDE FOR CASEWORKERS 61–71, available
at http://www.cookcountycourt.org/divisions/cp/docs/Child_Protection_Division_Caseworker_Manual.pdf,
for detailed information on the Benchmark Permanency Hearings.
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young person’s care. While the young person’s lawyer is present, she is largely silent,
though in the best cases she has done considerable work with the young person in
preparation for the hearing, and she is prepared to take action following the hearing to
ensure compliance with the judge’s orders. The young person is also encouraged to bring
an adult who can serve as a source of support at the hearing and on an ongoing basis as
the young person pursues the goals established there.
¶21
With the young person’s greater role in the proceedings comes greater
responsibility and accountability as well. The young person develops a written
―contract‖ with the judge that serves as the basis for services provided in support of the
young person’s ambitions and as a record of the commitments made by the young person.
At the next hearing, which will often be scheduled within weeks or even days of the
previous hearing, the court will assess the young person’s compliance with those
commitments as well as the state agency’s compliance with the obligations imposed by
court order at the earlier hearing. As in other caring relationships between adolescent and
adult, where the adult sees his role as that of helping the adolescent prepare for
competent, independent decision making, the judge responds to the failures of the young
person by expressing disappointment and exploring what can be done to avoid the failure
in the future, rather than simply by lecturing, or removing a privilege, as is standard fare
at an ordinary court review.
¶22
This is not to say that there is no place for lectures and the imposition of
consequences in juvenile court. Rather, it means that these responses must be embedded
in the context of a relationship and accompanied by a message of support and assistance
if they are to be effective teaching tools. Such relationships and interactions between
adults and adolescents are commonplace in families, schools, neighborhoods, clubs and
religious institutions. While, again, it is preferable to nurture these relationships in such
other contexts, the Benchmark proceedings were developed to address a relational void in
the lives of adolescents in foster care. A relationship between judge and adolescent will
necessarily be less intimate than a relationship between family members or close friends,
but the success of the Benchmark proceedings is tied to the judge’s commitment to
developing her relationship with the adolescents in her courtroom to the maximum extent
possible in that context.
¶23
While not yet formally studied, the Benchmark hearing process has been praised by
former participants24 and imitated in other jurisdictions.25 The Benchmark process is
24

See Nara Schoenberg, Young Woman Moves on, Creates New Life, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30, 2005, available
at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-12-30/features/0512300001_1_foster-care-system-benchmarkprogram-preschool (reporting that a former foster youth now working as a pre-school teacher has ―high
praise for the Benchmark program‖ and the judge who presided, and stated that ―they helped me become
the person I am today‖).
25
See, e.g., Christopher Smith, Study: Courts Can Do Better with Long-Term Foster Care, TEX. TRIB., Jan.
20, 2011, http://www.texastribune.org/texas-courts/texas-supreme-court/courts-can-do-better-with-longterm-foster-care/ (reporting study recommending the implementation of a Benchmark Permanency Hearing
process to improve the outcomes of foster youth aging out of care and suggesting that ―judges learn to see
their role not as arbitrators of a dispute, but as people responsible for the well-being of a child‖); Mary
Bissel, Not Ready to Go It Alone, WASH. POST, May 15, 2005, available at
http://newamerica.net/publications/articles/2005/not_ready_to_go_it_alone (describing problems with the
assistance given to foster youth aging out of care, and identifying Washington D.C.’s implementation of a
benchmark permanency hearing as one of the positive attempts to address the problem); see also National
Council Model Court Profiles, NAT’L COUNCIL JUV. & FAMILY CT. JUDGES,
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frequently held up as one of the ways to improve foster youths’ preparation for
independence, and the emphasis on better youth participation, decision-making, followup and support is consistent with my emphasis on affording young people decisionmaking practice. Unstudied is the effect of the process on young people’s attitude toward
legal actors and institutions, and particularly how the positive relationship with a single
judge translates into these more generalized attitudes. As the single best existing
example of what I propose here, these Benchmark hearings offer an excellent opportunity
to begin to study the developmental effects for adolescents of this very different
treatment in juvenile court.
B. Developmental Opportunities in Juvenile Justice Proceedings
¶24

In juvenile justice proceedings, the developmental deficits the adolescents bring to
court can also be expected to be great. And because their offending reflects problematic
decision making and a certain openness to defining themselves as outside of, or even in
opposition to, the systems of laws and legal actors that govern them, we should be
particularly eager to afford these young people opportunities to develop their decisionmaking competence and engage with government actors in positive ways. Moreover,
whereas my primary concern in the child welfare context is that the current court process
represents an important lost opportunity, my concern about the current juvenile justice
process is both that it fails to nurture positive developmental opportunities and also that it
may impose developmental harm. For offenders, the failure of the process may reinforce
or exacerbate their sense of outlier status, and push their emerging identities in an antisocial direction.
¶25
A number of related bodies of research suggest that young people’s experience in
juvenile court might shape their social identity in positive or negative ways. Primary
among them is the research that studies ―legal socialization,‖ that is, how we come to
hold the views we hold about legal actors and legal institutions and whether and why we
should obey the law. Social psychological research suggests that adults’ treatment in
court processes affects their attitudes about the law, and that they are more likely to see
legal authority as legitimate and feel an obligation to obey the law if they have been
shown respect and given an opportunity for meaningful participation in their judicial
proceedings. 26 The connection between adults’ perceptions of ―procedural justice,‖27
their belief in the law’s legitimacy, and their sense of obligation to obey the law has been
repeatedly demonstrated.28
¶26
We might expect that this effect would be even more marked among adolescents
for whom formulating beliefs about self and society is a central developmental task.
Preliminary research studying adolescents’ response to police interactions does indeed
suggest a correlation between personal experience with legal actors and attitudes formed

http://www.ncjfcj.org/content/blogcategory/112/151/ (describing the Model Courts supported by the
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, a number of which were modeled after the Cook
County Benchmark Hearings).
26
See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006).
27
Id.
28
Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-Regulation, 7 OHIO STATE J. CRIM.
L. 307, 313–14 (2009).
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about the legal system.29 In this research, perceived fair treatment by legal actors was
correlated with adolescents’ greater respect for legal authority, whereas treatment
perceived as unfair or harsh was associated with cynical views about the law. Another
study suggests that the influence their experience in the juvenile justice system has on
adolescents’ legal socialization may plateau in middle adolescence, but this research only
begs the question of how that influence might change in form and in duration, if
adolescents were involved in a dramatically different process in juvenile court.30
¶27
Other research, conducted in different but relevant contexts, highlights the potential
positive and negative effects of adolescents’ treatment in juvenile court. Supporting the
positive potential of significantly altered procedures is the research focused on
―restorative justice‖ approaches, which correlates pro-social offender effects with the
offender’s opportunity for direct and supported engagement with his victim and the
involved communities.31 Suggesting that status quo procedures could have a negative
effect on adolescents’ attitudes about the law are a constellation of theories, including
―defiance theory‖ and ―self-categorization theory,‖ that correlate anti-social conduct, and
society’s response to that conduct, with the development of an out-group mentality.32
Although we know little for certain about the current or potential effect of children’s
experience in court on their attitudes about the law and their place in legal institutions, we
know more than enough to conclude that the matter is worthy of further study and
experimentation.
C. Deriving Developmental Value from Process Rights
Narrowly defined, the term ―legal socialization‖ focuses on the process that leads
people to embrace the authority of law and their obligation to obey the law. This is
clearly an important developmental goal for any society. But our broader ambition for
our young citizens should be their embrace of a sense of self as part of, rather than
distinct from, the society that makes and enforces the laws. We aim to produce citizens
who not only perceive their legal institutions and actors as legitimate and therefore
worthy of obedience, but also as their system, a system they can take part in and not
simply be ruled by. Already discussed is the likely developmental value to adolescents of
being afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate in their hearings. Here, I focus on
the particular value for social and individual identity development that might come from
engendering a conception of that participation as a matter of right.
¶29
Young people are particularly likely to come to understand themselves as members
of the community that makes and enforces the law if they conceive of their participation
as an entitlement, afforded to them simply by virtue of that membership. But there are
two sorts of difficulties associated with asserting rights on behalf of adolescents that may
¶28

29

Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and Adolescents, 18 SOC. JUST. RES. 217,
236 (2005).
30
See Piquero et al., supra note 15, at 267 (2005).
31
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 78–79 (2002) (suggesting that
one explanation for the success of restorative justice programs is that youthful offenders are more likely to
understand what is going on, to feel more empowered to express their views, and to feel more respected
than in conventional court proceedings).
32
See id. at 81–90 (describing defiance and self-categorization theory and noting the role that disrespect for
the sanctioning authority plays in encouraging defiance or out-group identification).
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diminish the developmental value of those rights assertions. The first difficulty is one of
comprehension. The idea that their rights are in no way contingent on the consent of
adults in authority is not an easy concept for young people to understand, for it flies in the
face of their entire life experience. Asserting and preserving the rights of young people
therefore requires a special commitment and persistence among the lawyers and judges
responsible for safeguarding those rights. Moreover, to truly communicate the
significance of their actions, lawyers and judges must take special pains to make these
rights enforcements visible and comprehensible. At its best, a lawyer’s assertion, or a
judge’s acknowledgement, of an adolescent’s right of participation not only secures that
young person’s participation, but also teaches the young person something about the
value the system places on that participation.
¶30
The second difficulty in deriving developmental value from the assertion of
adolescents’ rights reflects a deeper problem of design. Unless rights of participation are
designed to ensure that adolescents experience that participation in some meaningful
way, an assertion of these rights cannot be expected to engender any sense of
membership in the legal community that sits in judgment.
¶31
We have made very little headway in securing meaningful participation for
adolescents, despite statutory and constitutional authority to do so. In the child welfare
context, as already noted, statutory language mandates that courts ―consult‖ with young
people in an ―age-appropriate manner,‖ as part of the court’s yearly review of their
permanency plans.33 But the thinness of efforts by federal regulators, state child welfare
agencies, children’s lawyers, or juvenile courts to alter practices when this consultation
requirement was added to the law is more evidence of the legal system’s complacent
acceptance of a developmentally unacceptable status quo.34 Moreover, efforts to assert
young people’s due process right to participate in child welfare proceedings have also
been minimal, focusing on the child’s right to counsel in the few cases brought.35
¶32
In the juvenile justice context, due process challenges are routine, but their focus
has not been on young people’s meaningful participation in their hearings. Rather, the
focus has been on securing as many adult criminal procedural rights as possible as a
safeguard against unwarranted exercises of state power. The due process rights secured
in In re Gault36 and subsequent cases, including the right to counsel, to notice of
proceedings, to call and cross-examine witnesses, and to avoid self-incrimination, have
enhanced young people’s ability to resist the force of the state in important ways. But
this adult conception of due process rights has continued to box children out of the
33

42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2008). More recently, Congress added an additional requirement that every
adolescent transitioning to adulthood have a ―transition plan‖ that is ―personalized at the direction of the
child . . . and is as detailed as the child may elect.‖ Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing
Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-351, § 202(3), 122 Stat. 3949, 3959 (2008).
34
See In re Pedro M., 864 N.Y.S.2d 869, 870 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2008), for a notable exception. That case
interpreted the consultation requirement, and New York’s implementing legislation, to create a
presumption that a child age seven or older will be present in court for his hearings. As the scenario set out
at the beginning of this Article illustrates, however, court attendance, itself hard to achieve, is hardly
sufficient to secure the active and meaningful participation championed here.
35
A state constitutional version of this claim was successful in Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue. 356 F.
Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (concluding that Georgia’s constitution affords children a due process right
to counsel in child protection proceedings, based in large part on cases interpreting the due process clause
of the U.S. Constitution).
36
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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proceedings, as lawyers speak for them in a language and format incomprehensible to
most who listen.37
¶33
For reasons discussed below, the trade-off between effective resistance to state
power through standard criminal defense lawyering and more meaningful youth
engagement through a shift in control of the discussion to the youth favors conventional
lawyerly control when the court is adjudicating guilt. But it is not clear that the trade-off
is the same once a young person has been adjudicated delinquent and the focus shifts to
dispositional aims.38 At this stage in the proceedings, we should worry about a system
that claims to address young people’s need for treatment and support and to hold young
people responsible for their actions, without meaningfully engaging young people in the
process that makes those assessments and assigns that responsibility. While the assertion
of young people’s participation rights under federal statutes and the Constitution offers a
foothold for lawyers interested in pressing for radical procedural reform, a recognition of
these rights in no way guarantees a departure from the status quo.
III. REMAKING JUVENILE COURT TO SERVE ADOLESCENTS’ DEVELOPMENTAL NEEDS
As lawyers and judges charged with promoting young people’s well-being through
their involvement in juvenile court, we should press for a court process that serves young
people’s developmental needs. Such a process requires a fundamental change in the
structure of juvenile court hearings, the role played by the young person, and the
interaction between the young person and the other actors in the courtroom. Bringing the
young person to the center of the hearing—the center of discussion, the center of decision
making, and planning—could give these young people two interrelated sorts of
experience that social science research, as well as common sense, associate with positive
adolescent development. First, the new process could give the juveniles essential
experience making decisions about, and taking responsibility for, their lives in a
supportive context, where mistakes can be reflected upon and corrected and successes
applauded and built upon. Second, the process could foster a relationship between judge
and juvenile that would nurture the juvenile’s sense of self as part of, rather than outside
of or in opposition to, our system of laws and legal actors.
¶35
Our aim should be to engage young people directly and repeatedly in discussions
with a single judge to address all issues of planning and implementation associated with
their dispositions. It should not be enough to give a young person an opportunity for
input—whether that input is provided through legal representation or an occasional
opportunity to speak in court. Rather, the juvenile should be given important
responsibility and decision-making authority throughout the process. To ensure this level
of involvement and control, all decisions relevant to the young person’s care, treatment,
education, punishment, and plans for the future should be discussed clearly and
completely at hearings, with sufficient advance warning of the matters to be discussed to
allow the young person to prepare to take positions and play a substantial role in the
¶34

37

Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault; 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 48–49 (2003).
Of course the more purely punitive the dispositions ordered, the greater the continuing need for lawyer
led legal representation. Conversely, the more the dispositional hearing and reviews focus on the current
and future needs of the juvenile, the more valuable the shift from formal, lawyer led representation to the
direct participation of the adolescent.
38
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discussion. This is not to suggest that all juveniles would readily embrace this greater
role. The point is not that young people are ready to assume these responsibilities, but
rather that they are ready to begin to learn, and will need our help in doing so. Again, our
aim should be to nurture a set of skills and sense of self among juveniles that increases
their chance of becoming successful adult participants in our political community.
¶36
While reforms along the lines I propose would be dramatic, they would not require
substantial changes in the law or in the stated purposes of the juvenile court. As noted,
the law already provides some support for a right of participation, and a central aim of
juvenile court proceedings is serving the needs of those whose life circumstances have
brought them into court. For at least three reasons, the proposed reforms could be most
easily and appropriately implemented in dispositional hearings and reviews. First, these
hearings do not implicate some of the delicate and difficult constitutional issues that
would arise if the process of adjudication, that is, fact-finding to determine guilt, were
shifted away from counsel and conventional adult procedural rights and toward a more
open, unrestrained conversation between the judge and young person.39 Second, the clear
benefits of keeping children with their families and out of the child welfare and juvenile
justice systems favor a more conventional criminal procedural rights based process for
the adjudicatory phase. And, third, the issues addressed in dispositional hearings and
reviews—that is, the needs of and plans for the young person, and the state’s response to
those needs and plans—are particularly well suited to the sort of youth involvement I
contemplate.
¶37
As noted, versions of what I propose here have been implemented successfully in a
small number of dependency courtrooms, and my call for reform in child welfare cases
can be conceived as a call to study those successes, and move from pilot programs to
more widespread implementation. In the juvenile justice context, experimentation with
reforms based on similar aims has occurred largely, if not exclusively, in programs
designed to keep young people out of court.40 But some young people end up in court,
and we can predict that those who do are likely to be at least as developmentally needy as
those who do not. Instead of offering these young people versions of the scenario
described at the beginning of this essay, we need to bring whatever successes are being
developed outside the court setting into the courtroom. There, the special authority of the
judge and the special nature of the proceedings should be harnessed to counteract rather
than exacerbate the many developmental disadvantages that have led to, or been
produced by, the state’s involvement.
¶38
Changes like those envisioned here will only occur if the judges and lawyers who
populate juvenile court proceedings press for change. As the Benchmark Hearings in
Cook County demonstrate, a single visionary judge can do a great deal for the young
people on her docket. It is my hope that a handful of judges, even one judge, in the
delinquency system will be so appalled by the status quo, and comfortable pushing the
envelope, that they (or she) will be willing to try some version of Benchmark-style
hearings in the juvenile justice system. Even a small experiment could teach us a lot
about what is possible to accomplish in that system.
39

See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13 (noting that its holding that the due process clause entitles juveniles to a
number of adult criminal procedural rights applies only to the adjudication phase, at which it is determined
whether the juvenile committed an offense that could justify the deprivation of his liberty).
40
See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 31.

332

Vol. 6:2]

Emily Buss

¶39

Lawyers, too, can press for this change, though, of course, they do not have the
same direct control over the process that judges have. Indeed, for lawyers to move the
process in the right direction they must be willing to make themselves extremely
unpopular in the courtroom. They need to abandon the comfortable chat described in the
opening scenario and the camaraderie it reflects among the league of professionals who
share more of a bond with one another in the courtroom than they share with their clients.
They need to make demands on themselves, on the other lawyers, and on the judges, that
will require a great deal of additional work and creativity. To push for these reforms,
lawyers must be ready to push against the other participants’ expectations and judges’
long-protected timetables. Indeed, they may need to set judges up for exasperation, if not
embarrassment, by refusing to agree to hearings that occur during school hours and
insisting that hearings be slowed down and unpacked so that their clients can
meaningfully track, and then participate in, all the decisions that are made.
¶40
I know, from many years of practice in juvenile court, that opposing the court’s
standard operating procedures is professionally risky and emotionally nearly impossible.
Even those among us who were comfortable challenging the state’s position on
substantive grounds, whether it was pressing for expensive services or for the return
home of a child, never pressed for real procedural reforms, for a radically different role
for our clients (and ourselves). It took my passive observation of many court hearings
after moving to academia to focus my attention on the developmental implications of
young people’s experience in court, and to reach the conclusion that the current state of
procedural affairs is unacceptable. Continuing to advocate at the margins within this
failed procedural model feels like zealous advocacy in the world of juvenile court. It
should be reconceived as complicity, and abandoned in pursuit of real, developmentally
appropriate change.
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